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Abstract 
This research examines end-user perceptions of an intelligence product disseminated from a state 
fusion center in the northeast region of the United States. The current literature suffers from an 
empirical gap within the arena of contemporary law enforcement intelligence; largely due to the 
difficulty of obtaining data related to such practices. This research informs this gap and provides 
insights into local law enforcement intelligence sharing. Descriptive statistics and interview 
narratives are presented. Original survey data was collected from a sample of law enforcement 
agencies subscribed to the fusion center’s intelligence listserv. Random interviews with survey 
respondents were also conducted and Nvivo software was utilized to develop qualitative 
constructs. Findings indicate the intelligence product is read daily and perceived to be 
moderately useful by recipients.  End-users are primarily concerned with jurisdiction-specific 
and officer safety-related information. Upper-level administrators are the organizational 
lynchpins for funneling information to patrol officers.  
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End-User Perceptions of Intelligence Dissemination from a State Fusion Center 
 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), the concept of 
multi-agency information centers in the United States was transformed into what are now known 
as fusion centers to serve as a key mechanism to improve law enforcement information sharing 
and the utilization of intelligence products.  In short, fusion centers are entities diverse in 
personnel and agency composition that serve as a conduit to facilitate effective information 
sharing across both geographic and authoritative jurisdictions (i.e., local, state, and federal).  
Though fusion centers are not the sole component of law enforcement intelligence, they perhaps 
represent the most significant investment of resources and tangible change in law enforcement 
post-9/11.  Thus it is not surprising that these centers have been the subject of intense debate.  
While the majority of government reports and academic research to date has advocated for these 
centers (Carter and Chermak, 2012), concerns over their operations (US Senate, 2012) and 
overall effectiveness (Taylor and Russell, 2012) have been called into question.   
The literature on fusion centers is progressing, but significant knowledge gaps remain.  
Specifically, the literature is sparse with respect to; 1) what extent do recipients of intelligence 
products further share this information within their own agency; 2) the frequency at which fusion 
centers distribute intelligence products; and 3) intelligence products desired by recipients from 
fusion centers.  This research is not a parsimonious test of theory.  Both scholars and 
professionals are in need of insight with regard to the practices examined within this research.  
Sparse evidence exists pertaining to reciprocal relationships for information and intelligence 
sharing between fusion center and state and local law enforcement.  From an academic research 
perspective, the literature is uninformed about how state and local law enforcement perceive the 
products they receive from fusion centers as well as the perception of information provided to 
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fusion centers from state and local law enforcement.  The present study seeks to inform the 
literature regarding the former knowledge gap and provide insights into fusion center 
information sharing through original survey data and interviews with law enforcement personnel 
who receive fusion center analytic products. 
 
Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Information Sharing  
 One of the key elements to the successful use of intelligence for the prevention and 
mitigation of risk is widespread information sharing.  Such risks, especially at the fusion center 
level, are focused on terrorism.  The Office of Homeland Security’s National Strategy for 
Information Sharing (2007, p.1) stated “Our success in preventing future terrorist attacks 
depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding 
those who want to attack us, the tactics they use, and the targets that they intend to attack.”  To 
this end, law enforcement must have effective mechanisms for sharing information as well as a 
willingness to engage in proactive information sharing.  There is reason to suspect that, despite 
substantial effort, information sharing in the area of intelligence is significantly limited 
(Chermak et al., 2013; Cooney et al., 2011).  Intelligence should guide law enforcement’s 
operational and strategic decision making (Carter, 2009).  In order to achieve this desired end, 
intelligence must get into the hands of decision makers in the form of an actionable intelligence 
product from which action can be taken.  Fusion centers are the medium though which actionable 
intelligence products reach state and local law enforcement.  
 
The Fusion Center Model 
3 
 
There are currently 78 official fusion centers in the U.S. (US House of Representatives, 
2013) to increase the exchange of information and data across government and private sectors to 
enhance law enforcement’s ability to fight crime and terrorism and prevent threats (Global 
Intelligence Working Group, 2005).  The relationship between state and local law enforcement 
and fusion centers is reinforced by the National Strategy for Homeland Security that identifies 
the philosophy as one of the primary tools to combat terrorism and threats to the U.S (Homeland 
Security Council, 2007).  Fusion centers are designed to serve as a conduit for facilitating 
information sharing across jurisdictions while also providing an analytic capability for many 
local agencies that would otherwise not have access to crime and intelligence analysts.  In order 
for fusion centers to meet their overarching mission, to improve information sharing, they must 
have an effective method of communication with state and local law enforcement.        
There is no single model for a fusion center, namely because of the diverse needs and 
environmental characteristics that affect the structure, processes, and products of such a center.  
A Congressional Research Service report raised questions regarding the current and potential 
efficacy of fusion centers. The report notes that in light of the growth of the fusion centers in 
state and local jurisdictions without a coordinated national plan, “there appears to be no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ structural or operational model for fusion centers” (Rollins, 2008, p.18).  From a 
centralized federal perspective, as reflected in the report, the lack of a uniform model is assumed 
to be a flaw (Taylor and Russell, 2012).  However, the state and local perspective is somewhat 
different.  Indeed, the ability to build a fusion center around grassroots needs is preferred; this 
permits state and local agencies to mold the fusion center into a model that best suits the needs 
and challenges that are idiosyncratic to each jurisdiction and the communities they serve. As 
noted by Johnson and Dorn (2008, p.38) in describing the New York State Intelligence Center, 
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“Creating one center for intelligence and terrorism information, to combine and distribute 
that information to law enforcement agencies statewide, prevents duplication of effort by 
multiple agencies. Additionally, one state fusion center serving the entire New York law 
enforcement community provides a comprehensive picture of criminal and terrorists 
networks, aids in the fight against future terrorists events and reduces crime.” 
 
Fusion Centers and Local Police 
 Fusion centers serve as a lynchpin of information sharing both vertically between levels 
of law enforcement as well as horizontally across state and local agencies.  The nexus between 
threats to public safety and local law enforcement has been well documented (Boba, 2009; 
Clarke and Newman, 2006; Newman and Clarke 2008).  Local law enforcement agencies are in a 
unique position to push vital information to fusion centers as a result of their knowledge about 
individuals, groups, and organizations operating in local communities as part of their day-to-day 
operational work.  As Bayley and Weisburd (2009) noted, “low policing” that focuses on street-
level interactions among law enforcement and community members is perhaps one of the most 
significant benefits police have in their counter-terrorism efforts.   
As Masse and his colleagues (2007, p.7) note in their report to Congress: “The 800,000 
plus law enforcement officers across the country know their communities most intimately and, 
therefore, are best placed to function as the “eyes and ears” of an extended national security 
community.  They have the experience to recognize what constitutes anomalous behavior in their 
areas of responsibility and can either stop it at the point of discovery (a more traditional law 
enforcement approach) or follow the anomaly or criminal behavior, either unilaterally or jointly 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to extract the maximum intelligence value from 
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the activity (a more intelligence-based approach).”  Fusion centers are positioned to be the 
operational capacity through which local law enforcement engage in the more intelligence-based 
approach (Carter, 2014; Masse et al., 2007).  This, however, is a significant shortcoming of the 
current knowledge base as the majority of fusion center research has either been conceptual or 
focused on fusion center operations and practices rather than their interaction with local 
agencies.   
There are two notable studies that explored fusion centers and local law enforcement.  
Both of these studies focused primarily on local perceptions of the usefulness of fusion centers.  
First, in their study of the 184 local law enforcement executives in South Carolina, Cooney and 
her colleagues (2011) noted that while most local law enforcement personnel perceived the 
South Carolina fusion center to be useful, the percentage of locals with opposing perceptions was 
significant enough to warrant further research and policy reconsiderations.  Their study also 
concluded that local agencies which identified themselves as engaging in “intelligence-led 
policing” viewed the fusion center more favorably.  Second, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) 
utilized survey and interview information from 51 state troopers about their perception of 
information received from and sent to a fusion center in the Northeast region of the United 
States.  Their findings indicated an overall ambiguity of the fusion center’s role with state and 
local law enforcement.  Troopers tended to prefer information received from fellow troopers over 
fusion center products as well as rarely providing information to the center to be included in 
analysis.  Despite low overall levels of trooper acceptance of the fusion center, it was noted that 
troopers consistently accessed fusion center information – likely due to its ease of access.  
Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) go on to note the importance for future research to explore how 
fusion centers can disseminate intelligence products more strategically and that such an 
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exploration would require surveying end-users of intelligence products.   The current study seeks 
to build on this recommendation by surveying end-user perceptions of a fusion center in the 
Northeast region.  
     
Methodology 
Survey of Intelligence Product Readers 
Empirical research exploring law enforcement intelligence issues has been severely 
hampered by a lack of access to, and unwillingness to participate by, intelligence personnel 
within agencies (see Chermak et al., 2013).  Moreover, ideal surveying methods – such as 
random sampling – are not feasible given the fidelity of intelligence practices nationwide.  Not 
every law enforcement agency in the country is actively engaged in information sharing and 
intelligence practices (Carter and Phillips, 2014), thus a targeted sample is required.  Virtually all 
intelligence research to date (post-9/11) has been conducted based on purposive samples where 
the researchers had an existing relationship with the intelligence personnel (see Carter and 
Phillips, 2014; Chermak et al., 2013; Cooney et al., 2011; Cope, 2004; Darroch and Mazerolle, 
2013; Graphia-Joyal, 2010; Ratcliffe and Walden, 2010; Ratcliffe et al., 2014).  This purposive 
sampling approach is even more pertinent with regard to fusion centers.  Per the Department of 
Homeland Security-mandated fusion center guidelines (Global Intelligence Working Group, 
2005) and baseline capabilities of fusion centers (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2008), 
each fusion center is required to maintain strict security requirements, including having a 
sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) for the handling of classified information.   
Despite scholars not having an interest in classified information, the presence of such 
security measures is believed to inhibit a willingness to share even the most basic of information 
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regarding fusion center practices. As a result, data extraction for research purposes relies on a 
rapport between researchers and intelligence practitioners.  Such an approach is commonplace in 
other aspects of policing where information is sensitive, such as policing cybercrime (Holt and 
Bossler, 2012), the mentally ill (Borum et al., 1998) and sex workers (Simic et al., 2006).  The 
present research required a purposive sampling frame in order to accurately explore end-users of 
intelligence products from the fusion center.   
The present study utilizes a sample of law enforcement agencies that subscribe to the 
fusion center’s intelligence email listserv which distributes a daily intelligence bulletin.  
Information within this bulletin is divided into categories that include issues such as officer 
safety, current threats, be on the lookout (BOLOs), and emerging crime tactics and techniques.  
A sentiment exists among some fusion center employees that very few people read the bulletin 
on a daily basis.  As a result of this sentiment, there has also been dissatisfaction among some 
individuals who work to create the intelligence product because they question the usefulness of 
their work.  To date, there has been no systematic tracking of the intelligence product to 
determine the number of people who access or share this product within their agency.  Thus, the 
fusion center was eager to understand more about its daily product and to receive information 
that would help it decide how to make it more useful for law-enforcement subscribers who seek 
to best utilize the information it contains.   
While beneficial for purposes of reaching end-users, this listserv also created limitations 
for generalizability of the findings to be presented.  Due to obvious security concerns, the 
researchers were not able to have access to the persons directly through the listserv and thus 
relied on fusion center personnel to disseminate the survey instrument.  As a result, the 
researchers had no control over the sampling frame.  Simultaneous to the survey instrument 
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being disseminated, the listserv being utilized for sampling was continuing to expand as part of a 
fusion center initiative to improve its reach to local law enforcement agencies.  A web-based 
survey was disseminated to agencies on the fusion center listserv.  At the time the survey was 
initially disseminated to end-users in March 2011, the listserv was comprised of 427 state, 
municipal, and tribal law enforcement agencies as well as public works, other government 
organizations (such as the Attorney General’s Office), and members of the private sector.  When 
the sampling period closed in May 2011, the listserv included 609 total organizations (from 
multiple contiguous states).   
In total, 315 agency responses were received.  Each response was unique to a single 
agency.  Since multiple persons from a single agency are included on the fusion center’s listserv, 
it was clearly communicated to the fusion center research partner managing the survey that any 
multiple responses from the same agency be identified.  No multiple responses from the same 
agency were observed.  A conservative response rate of 53 percent (315/609) is reported for this 
study.  Given the fusion center’s listserv is comprised of 85% state and local law enforcement 
agencies (as explained by the fusion center research partner managing the email dissemination) 
from urban areas and the proportion of state and local agencies within the responses received 
was 87% (and 67% urban), the findings are likely not influenced by non-response bias.  
However, since access to the listserv was restricted and no determinations could be made with 
regard to the characteristics of responding versus non-responding agencies, it cannot be said with 
certainty that non-responses bias is not a limitation to this research.  In addition to the descriptive 
statistics to follow, respondents were provided open-ended opportunities within the survey to 
express levels of satisfaction or disappointment with the intelligence product bulletin.   
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Interviews with End-User Personnel 
To better understand the interaction of end-user personnel with the intelligence product 
and the information reported in survey responses, interviews were conducted with the recipients 
to provide more depth and context to the survey results.  Creswell (2008, p.4) characterizes this 
research approach as “a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or 
groups ascribe to a social or human problem.”  The intent of employing these interviews is not 
necessarily to arrive at an answer to a question, but rather to better understand the interviewee’s 
interpretation of phenomena through the lens of their practical experience (Seidman, 2006). 
Since state and local police departments represent the majority of the intelligence product 
listserv, and are arguably the most direct end-users of fusion center products, a random sample of 
20 municipal police personnel who completed the survey were interviewed for this research.  
Though not truly a random sample as the sample population does not include agencies that did 
not respond to the survey, the randomization process is important to establish the absence of 
researcher bias in agency selection for interviews.  The researchers attempted to conduct 
interviews with agencies that did not respond to the survey to gather more representative 
information.  However the fusion center could not release contact information for agencies not 
consenting to be contacted via the survey.  Respondents were asked to include their contact 
information if they were open to being contacted regarding their survey results; 112 persons 
provided their contact information. These 112 persons were then arranged alphabetically by last 
name and numbered from zero to 112.   
A random number generator was then used to select 20 of these 112 persons.  Of the 20 
law enforcement personnel interviewed, six were chiefs of police or upper management, eight 
were middle management, and six were frontline supervisors or patrol officers.  Each individual 
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was interviewed for a period of one hour using a semi-structured interview format to allow the 
interviewer to employ proper follow-up queries in accordance with the person’s position within 
the department (i.e., Chief had different perspectives of intelligence than frontline officers).  The 
insights provided by these personnel are critical to understanding under what circumstances 
police utilize intelligence products.  Trends from the open-ended survey responses and 
interviews with personnel are included in the findings to provide contextual insights to the 
limited descriptive data.  Nvivo software was utilized to organize and identify thematic 
constructs from the qualitative information gleaned from the interviews.   
 
Findings 
For ease of interpretation, this section is organized by separating the survey and interview 
findings across each key area.  While such a discussion, specifically of interviewee insights, may 
arguably be more appropriate within the conclusions and discussion section, the information is 
provided here to contextualize the descriptive information.  It should be noted that the findings 
presented are basic descriptives.  Exploratory analyses were conducted by the researchers to 
provide additional insights from the data, such as variation by agency or personnel type.  
However, since no observable differences were identified and given space considerations for 
qualitative narrative, these analyses are not provided.  A lack of variation was also observed 
across interviewees.  The lack of differences by agency type is perhaps a welcomed diagnostic as 
intelligence practice (in theory) should not differ across varying agencies (Carter and Carter, 
2009a; Ratcliffe, 2008).  In addition, it would be interesting to examine these findings in parallel 
with crime.  Differences in crime type and frequency could likely influence agency perceptions 
of intelligence products.  Unfortunately, such an analysis was not possible due to the inability to 
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identify specific agencies (fusion center security concern) to link their responses with 
corresponding crime data.   
Table 1 provides descriptives of agencies responding to the survey.  The majority 
(61.9%) of respondents were local agencies while a quarter of the respondents (25.1%) were 
from a state organization and roughly eight percent worked for a federal entity.  Only one 
percent was from a tribal organization and four percent of respondents worked in the private 
sector.  There was an almost equal distribution of representation from upper-level management 
(33.6%), middle-level management (30.2%), and patrol (36.2%). Most of the respondents 
(67.6%) indicated that they worked in an urban setting.   
 
[ Table I approximately here ] 
 
Dissemination of the Intelligence Product - Survey 
Survey items targeted how the intelligence product bulletin is received,1 how it is made 
available to patrol, and, if e-mailed, to how many people it is forwarded.  Table 2 illustrates the 
extent to which the intelligence product bulletin is disseminated.  An overwhelmingly majority 
of respondents indicated they received the bulletin via e-mail (84.4%).  Approximately 15 
percent indicated they received the bulletin from the chief administrator of their organization 
(i.e., chief of police) while only one respondent indicated manually seeking the bulletin – likely 
through secured access of an electronic information sharing system such as the Regional 
Information Sharing System network (RISS.net).  The primary audience for the intelligence 
1While the fusion center sends out an e-mail containing the product, we surmised that people could also receive the 
product as a forward from someone else. The intelligence product is also posted to RISSNET and could be 
downloaded.   
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product bulletin is the local law enforcement community; specifically patrol as they have the 
most day-to-day contact with the public.  When asked how the information in the intelligence 
product bulletin is made available to those patrol officers and frontline personnel, the majority of 
respondents (63.1%) said it was made available by e-mail, followed by a much less frequency of 
those receiving the information during a meeting (19.8%) such as roll call, and just under five 
percent indicated the information was posted in a public place within the agency.  A similar 
percentage of respondents indicated the information was made available through other methods.  
Of the respondents who chose to provide an open-response, a consistent theme emerged that 
information was made available to specific units within the department – such as gang or drug 
squads.   
[ Table II approximately here ] 
 
Important to the aspect of information availability is the possibility that information – in 
this case the intelligence product bulletin – is passed between members of an organization.  
Thus, more personnel within a department are likely receiving information beyond what is 
captured by recipients on a listserv.  Through interviews with officers from local agencies, it was 
identified that in some departments the supervisor is the only person who receives the 
intelligence product at their respective agency.  He or she will then forward it to an intelligence 
officer, patrol officers, or the entire frontline and middle management.  Table 2 illustrates the 
extent to which respondents indicated the intelligence product bulletin is forwarded to others 
within the organization.  Of those who responded, most indicated they forwarded the intelligence 
product to one-to-five other people within their organization on a regular basis (15.5%).  A 
similar number of respondents indicated they regularly forwarded the bulletin to six-to-ten 
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(7.1%) and 11 to 50 people (8.5%).  Less than three percent indicated they forwarded the bulletin 
to more than 51 people.  Though the data do not allow for comparisons of these findings to 
respondents’ agency size, these findings are likely related to agency size.  For example, while a 
respondent may only forwarded the bulletin to six-to-ten other persons, this could possibly 
represent the majority or entirety of the respondent’s organization.  A consistent trend of the 
respondents who provided an open-response indicated they selectively forwarded the bulletin to 
others whom they feel it was relevant.  
 
Dissemination of the Intelligence Product - Interviews 
In-depth interviews with officers from different agencies revealed four important and 
interesting findings related to the dissemination of the intelligence product bulletin.  First, a trend 
that emerged from the interviews was that many of the officers interviewed did not know how 
they initially started receiving the intelligence product bulletin e-mails. Many of the officers in 
middle-management positions or in patrol said they started receiving the intelligence product one 
day and surmised their chief had included their names on the list.  Moreover, these officers 
indicated they did not know whether others within the department were on the distribution list, 
but believed their colleagues also received it as a result of being enlisted by someone else as 
well.  One of the detectives interviewed acknowledged he was always under the assumption 
everyone in the agency received the bulletin until interviews for this study were conducted and 
he was surprised to discover this was not the case.  Second, the extent to which one person 
within a department would take it upon him/herself to make patrol aware of the intelligence 
product bulletin.  Many departments lacked sufficient staff to cull through intelligence and send 
out only what was relevant to patrol.  A majority of the officers interviewed indicated they 
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printed out the bulletin, or specific parts of it, to distribute to patrol or display on a board where 
it would be noticed by patrol.   
Third, select officers may not forward the intelligence product to others in their agency if 
they believe everyone is receiving it already.  Regardless of department size, dissemination of 
the intelligence product varies and is fragmented for some agencies.  One officer interviewed 
from an urban agency indicated the department had its own intelligence unit and integrated 
information from the intelligence product into its own bulletin.  Another officer, also from an 
urban agency, indicated there was a lack information sharing and intelligence product 
distribution in his department.  Moreover, this officer went on to acknowledge this problem 
exists even among the different patrol shifts as officers did not communicate important local 
intelligence gathered from the night before.  The final trend among the officers interviewed was 
that not all officers had access to work e-mail; and those who did were not required to check it 
regularly.  Thus, the only way for them to receive the information consistently was if someone 
within the department was tasked, or takes the initiative, to disseminate the information to patrol 
via another manner – such as roll-call or posting it within a common place.     
 
Utilization of the Intelligence Product - Survey 
Critical to exploring the utility of intelligence products is the extent to which different 
personnel within an agency use the intelligence provided. Responses to the item asking 
respondents to indicated who in their organization primarily uses intelligence were not mutually 
exclusive; respondents could indicate multiple types of personnel as there are likely to be 
multiple users and restricting responses to a single selection would not be representative of 
practice.  Table 3 presents the findings of the intelligence-users item.  Of those who responded, 
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most indicated investigative personnel primarily utilized the intelligence product bulletin (36%) 
followed by the notion that everyone in the organization utilized the bulletin (28.7%).  Patrol 
(24.4%), middle management (23.6%), and senior officials (19.8%) were indicated to utilize the 
intelligence product similarly.  A promising finding is that less than three percent indicated no 
one in the organization used the bulletin – thus hopefully reaffirming the overall utility of the 
intelligence product to the organizations to which it is distributed.   
 
[ Table III approximately here ] 
 
In an effort to explore the extent to which recipients of the intelligence product bulletin 
are reading the actual bulletin, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they read 
the bulletin attachment for further information as well as the last time they read the attachment 
closely.  Beyond estimating the frequency of the actual bulletin being read, such measures also 
highlight the extent to which the bulletin appeals to the recipients.  Table 3 further illustrates the 
extent to which the intelligence product bulletin is utilized by the recipients.  The results are 
insightful.  Of those who responded, 59.2 percent indicated they opened the attachment daily 
followed by 29 percent that indicated they read the attachment once or twice a week.   Less than 
three percent of respondents indicated they read the intelligence product bulletin once a month or 
never.   
Despite assurances that the survey was anonymous, survey respondents may have 
answered in what they perceived to be a socially desirable way and thus may have felt the need 
to overestimate how often they read the intelligence product bulletin.  This bias was hopefully 
mitigated via the web-based survey format as evidence exists that people will answer in a less 
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socially desirable way when using an electronic survey (Kiesler and Sproull, 1986).  In order to 
reaffirm these findings, a second question gauged respondents’ frequency of reading the 
intelligence product bulletin within a past timeframe.  These results are also presented in Table 3.  
Among the respondents, 50 percent acknowledged they read the intelligence product within the 
last day followed by 25 percent responding they had read it in the last three days, and 12.5 
percent within the last week at the time of the survey.  Less than two percent had not read the 
bulletin within the last month while 10.7 percent acknowledged they could not remember the last 
time they read the bulletin.  The findings from these two items related to the frequency at which 
recipients read the intelligence product bulletin attachment were consistent with one another.     
 
Utilization of the Intelligence Product – Interviews 
In-depth interviews were conducted to provide further context to how patrol received the 
intelligence product bulletin.  In some departments, the chief had decided that all personnel 
should regularly receive the bulletin; either by e-mail or during the roll-call meeting at the 
beginning of the shift.  Though the information was made available to all personnel, there 
appeared to be no informal or formal mechanisms to motivate personnel to actually read the 
bulletin.  In other departments, only detectives received the bulletin.  Interviews with other 
officers indicated their agency practice was to print the bulletin and place it in the break room or 
in a binder with other notices for the patrol.  This binder would typically contain “be-on-the-
lookouts” (BOLOs) and other officer-safety notices.   
Interviews with officers from different agencies provided context for why end-users of 
the intelligence product bulletin were motivated to open the attachment.  Though respondents 
reported a variety of motives that prompted them to read the bulletin, consistent trends emerged.  
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One of the most frequent trends was that officers perceived reading the bulletin as a 
responsibility of their job.  These officers said it was their due diligence to keep up with threats 
in order to piece together information and make better decisions.  Another group of respondents 
stated they read the bulletin because it pertained to their area of patrol or an area very close to 
them.  A smaller group of respondents said they read the bulletin because it sounded interesting 
or because they saw something included which they perceived to likely occur in their own 
jurisdiction.   
In addition, the interviews helped reveal how frequently police personnel across different 
levels of the agency read the intelligence product bulletin. Upper-level management (i.e. chiefs, 
captains, and lieutenants) skimmed the intelligence product every day.  Their knowledge of the 
agency and community seemed to facilitate the digestion of the information and identify 
information germane to their needs and concerns.  Conversely, middle-management (i.e., 
detectives and sergeants) were less likely to read through the bulletin at all.  Many of these 
officers acknowledged their tasks and responsibilities were relegated to issues outside of the 
intelligence product bulletin and those that the information “pertained most to” would read it 
when necessary and “keep them in the loop” with regards to pertinent information.  These same 
officers indicated they would read the bulletin if they had extra time.   
When asked what types of headline information made them read further, all of the 
interviewees mentioned issues regarding officer safety or cities and counties in their immediate 
vicinity.  Many of the officers skipped information if was not about something in their area.  For 
example, officers southern parts of the state scrolled down to the southern state section of the 
intelligence product bulletin to see if there were any crime patterns emerging in that area.  One 
officer, however, did say he read about what was occurring in the northern part of the state 
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because he believed that crime patterns and trends that first occurred in that area would 
eventually be replicated in the southern part of the state.  Interviewees also acknowledged they 
would read the information in the bulletin if the headlines corresponded to intelligence regarding 
soft targets in their own communities.  For example, one police officer explained that, because 
his town has many highways and hotels, he looked for headlines that may offer insights about 
highways as targets or new tactics or techniques criminals are using involving transportation and 
trafficking.  
 
Perceptions of Intelligence Product End-Users - Survey 
In an attempt to gauge respondents’ priorities related to the utility of the intelligence 
product, items were included to ask the sample which crimes were priorities to their agency as 
well as what bulletin frequency would be most useful.  Responses to the crime priorities item 
were not mutual exclusive.  Results for these two items are presented in Table 4.  The majority of 
respondents (63%) indicated property crimes were a priority.  Though this may seem somewhat 
surprising as violent crimes are widely recognized to be a higher priority than property crime, the 
item did not ask respondents to specific which single crime was the highest priority.  Likely 
driving the frequency of property crime responses is a lack of violent crime among a number of 
respondents’ jurisdictions.  Property crimes are typically ubiquitous across jurisdictions whereas 
violent crime is more centrally located.  Fifty-seven percent of respondents did acknowledge that 
violent crime was a priority, followed by public nuisance (42.3%), terrorism (36.2%), and white 
collar crime (41.5%).  Of respondents who indicated “other” and chose to provide a response, 
many said the focus of their department was “all of the crimes” or “all of the above.”   
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[ Table IV approximately here ] 
 
  Lastly, items were included to assess the importance respondents ascribed to the 
intelligence product bulletin and how it could be improved.  These results are provided in Table 
4.  Respondents were asked to rate the information contained within the intelligence product 
bulletin on a polar scale from one to ten (1 = Not valuable at all, 10 = Extremely Valuable).  The 
majority of respondents (80%) rated the intelligence product bulletin at six or higher.  Assuming 
six would be the data cutoff point at which the intelligence product could be considered either 
valuable or not to the end-users (given that six and higher on the scale represents an affirmative 
response to valuable), 80% of respondents perceive the information included to be of value.  The 
modal response was eight with nearly a quarter of the responses. Approximately 20 percent of 
respondents perceived the intelligence product to provide little or no value.   
 
Perceptions of Intelligence Product End-Users - Interviews 
During interviews with the police personnel, a common concern expressed by analysts 
was information overload – whether the fusion center was sending out too much information too 
frequently.  Information overload can occur from receiving a manageable about of information 
much too frequently or receiving an unmanageable amount of information at an acceptable 
frequency.  Since quantifying the optimal amount of information desired by end-users is 
difficult, the present research conceptualizes information overload as receiving information too 
frequently.  To explore this concern, respondents were asked what type of dissemination 
schedule would be most useful.  Of those who responded, the same percentage indicated that a 
daily (38.6%) or weekly (38.6%) bulletin would be most useful.  Approximately six percent felt 
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the schedule should be reduced to biweekly or monthly e-mails while nine percent indicated the 
bulletin should be disseminated only when a significant event occurred (such as the Boston 
Marathon Bombing or the Super Bowl).  A common theme among the seven percent who 
responded “other” and provided a response was to receive the bulletin on a daily basis along with 
a supplement specific to a special event. 
Interviews with police personnel reiterated findings portrayed by the survey results.  
Many officers appreciated the information, even if it was available on open-source websites.  
Interviewees said they did not always have time to read newspapers and could, therefore, go to 
the intelligence product bulletin to get the most accurate account of what had occurred nationally 
or internationally.  Not every person interviewed agreed that all of the information in the 
intelligence product warranted inclusion.  One analyst, in charge of collecting bulletins and then 
disseminating pertinent information to his department bi-weekly, stated he thought patrol officers 
would see any pertinent open-source material in the news; therefore, he believed there was no 
reason for the fusion center to include this information within intelligence reports.  This 
perspective related to open-source information was reiterated by a number of personnel 
interviewed.  
Perhaps the most consistent trend revealed during the interviews was that of a focus on 
officer safety as these were the tips that were believed to be the most important aspects and that 
many police officers read and passed on to others.  The officers said that, while they sometimes 
saw the information in other places, safety was such a main concern that there was no harm in 
reinforcing the message.  One police officer recounted how he had passed along information that 
proved to be useful regarding a new suicide technique involving a poisonous gas made from a 
detergent:  
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“They make a poisonous gas out of detergents, over the counter stuff. [The fusion center] 
put a product about that. Coincidentally two weeks later we were one of five incidents 
where someone tried to kill themselves that way. I had two officers go to the hospital but 
they were aware enough about it to get away from it a lot quicker so their exposure was a 
lot less. Things like that make it a lot more valuable to us. That wound up preventing a lot 
more injuries”.  
 
Another officer offered a calculated reason for wanting geographic-specific information 
in the intelligence product: 
For me, the county breakdown—if there was more detail in there … it helps us, we’re 
always looking at that for patterns. It helps us to identify things so that we can form links. 
Even though scientifically, I can’t boil that down, I can say [to the fusion center] we have 
noticed that in this track flyer, you may not have reviewed yet or didn’t get because 
[police departments] only broadcast it to certain areas. We want to bring this to your 
attention. If we can get more detail in the top part of that report in the county, that would 
be very beneficial because there’s [some] things that are listed in there that we definitely 
take notice of because of the dynamics of our township and the geography of what we 
have going on here and if we had more detail, it’s just going to make us more aware. 
Since I know that we try to be very proactive in the intelligence front, collecting 
information, disseminating information that would be very beneficial to us to have that 
detail”. 
 
This police officer, like many others interviewed, expressed a general view of the intelligence 
product as a method of informing their own intelligence.  As one officer, who reads the bulletin 
regularly, pointed out, “Many police officers understand that it is generic information, but at 
least you can get a snapshot of what’s going on in the state.” 
 
 Discussion and Conclusions 
The findings presented here, while exploratory, provide unique insights to practice as 
well as a new contribution to the literature on law enforcement intelligence and information 
sharing.  Moreover, research in the field of law enforcement intelligence has documented the 
difficulty in obtaining data from fusion centers to guide such research (see Chermak et al., 2013; 
Cooney et al., 2011; Grapia-Joyal, 2010).  In light of diminishing federal resources to fund 
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counter-terrorism initiatives, fusion centers have recently begun to come under scrutiny to 
substantiate their operations and effectiveness (Taylor and Russell, 2012; US Senate, 2012).  
Metrics of effectiveness and benchmarks for success related to information sharing are difficult 
to ascertain.  Quantifying the degree to which local law enforcement find intelligence products 
useful or which products lead to arrests, prevented threats, increases in case correlations, or even 
terror suspects caught would all be welcomed – however they are largely outside the grasp of 
valid measurement.  One metric that is not difficult to quantify is the volume of intelligence 
products created and distributed.  In its most simple form, law enforcement recognized the need 
to share more information post-9/11.  The best way to accomplish this is to create a large volume 
of information that is disseminated to other agencies.  Within the law enforcement information-
sharing community, the myth pervades that an increasing amount of information shared with 
others in the larger community is a sign of productivity and utility.   
If the quantity and frequency of information dissemination is believed to be the desired 
end for the intelligence and information sharing process, the effectiveness of these efforts are 
likely to be undermined.  Though scholars have conceptually emphasized the importance of 
quality versus quantity and frequency with regards to law enforcement intelligence (Carter and 
Carter, 2009a, 2009b; Chermak et al, 2013; Ratcliffe and Walden, 2010), the findings presented 
here are perhaps the first empirical exploration of this aspect of information sharing and fusion 
centers among end-users of intelligence products.   
As a public entity formed to respond to the law-enforcement community, the fusion 
center must adhere to the requests of the agencies it serves in order to contribute to the public 
welfare.  It is not enough to bring the different agencies together and provide evidence that they 
are collaborating.  The fusion center must have something tangible to show for these efforts.  By 
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demonstrating it is acting on the collective values of the public and informing the law-
enforcement community of terrorism issues in the intelligence product, the fusion center is able 
to demonstrate its legitimacy and, therefore, its existence.  By creating and disseminating the 
intelligence product bulletin, the fusion center strengthens public support and secures its survival 
– largely dependent on the misinformed notion that “more is better” with information sharing.  
One of the methods by which the fusion center demonstrates its utility to the Department of 
Homeland Security and its many partners is to disseminate a large quantity of information to a 
large distribution list.  Beyond the raw numbers of this large distribution, it is important explore 
if the end-users who receive the information are the appropriate recipients and how they were 
chosen to be the end-users by their department. 
End-users of intelligence products must see the application of the information to their 
jurisdictions, priorities, and interests.  Thus, producers of intelligence – such as the fusion center 
and other fusion centers – must develop lines of communication that allow for consumers of their 
products to inform them on the types of information they desire and need.  While the pragmatic 
reality is that fusion centers cannot tailor specific intelligence products to each law enforcement 
entity, they can attempt to be geographic-centric.  Such an approach can inform end-users within 
the same geographic area (municipalities and counties) and likely increase effectiveness.  In 
addition, this approach would enhance the philosophical concept of intelligence-led policing as it 
is most effective when utilized across jurisdiction boundaries among geographically contiguous 
agencies (Carter and Carter, 2009a).  Chiefs and upper-management officials indicated they were 
more likely to scan through the entire bulletin because they feel they need to understand the 
crime environment in order to direct their patrol units – specifically looking for jurisdiction-
relevant information.  Inundating patrol with unnecessary information may cause them to ignore 
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the entire intelligence product.  Beyond improving effectiveness of intelligence products, 
tailoring these products to end-users will also improve sustain inability in the information 
sharing and fusion models.  If intelligence products are perceived useful by end-users, they are 
more likely to continue to request the products to be sent to their agency.  If the utility of the 
products is believed to be poor, the need for the products will decrease and the information 
sharing culture is likely to suffer.   
The findings presented here lend insights as to the most “appropriate” recipient of 
intelligence products among agencies in the state.  These persons are the decision-makers within 
each department who are able to identify and filter important information to patrol officers.  Such 
an approach is consistent with theoretical models of information sharing (Carter and Carter, 
2009a; Mackay and Ratcliffe, 2004).  Within the specific organization presented in this research, 
the fusion center, efforts should be focused on the bulletin’s listserv.  Findings indicated that 
more than 80 percent of respondents receive intelligence products via e-mail.  Thus, 
communications via email are likely to yield the greatest impact for improving upon intelligence 
products and successful dissemination.  Through interviews with fusion center personnel it was 
determined that as the list grew, the organization and management of the list was lost because no 
information was collected about the additional recipients.  In addition, there seems to have been 
little rhyme or reason, outside of convenience and networks, to explain who was actually added 
to the list.   
As noted in the findings, some of the intelligence product recipients did not forward the 
information to others in their department because they assumed others already received it.  Other 
recipients did not read the intelligence product at all because they believed others in their agency 
had and would brief them on anything important should it be included in the bulletin.  By 
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creating an improved listserv that targets the primary contact within agencies, the fusion center 
can likely facilitate the distribution of intelligence products to local agencies where it would then 
be more likely to reach the patrol level.  After 9/11, the law-enforcement community realized the 
importance of information-sharing, especially with patrol. Anecdotally, many people have heard 
of instances where a tip from a vigilant citizen or patrol officer has led to a big break in a case.  
A patrol officer is more likely to provide information from the street if they believe it might be 
significant (Henry, 2002).  With this in mind, it is incumbent upon the law enforcement 
intelligence community to provide patrol with the information they need to recognize instances 
with possible nexuses to crime and terrorism.  
 
Implications for Security 
 Regardless of the jurisdiction or context in which it is applied, security and information 
sharing have a direct and likely causal relationship.  Whether the security focus is research, 
policy, or practice, enhanced information sharing and the formal integration of intelligence and 
analysis into decision making will enhance or inform the desired outcome.  At the most basic 
level, state and local law enforcement can utilize intelligence products to deliver an improved 
service to the community – which includes enhancing community security through reduced 
crime, disorder, and victimization.  Securing the homeland was the catalyst for the inception of 
fusion centers.  Legislatures, law enforcement, and emergency management personnel alike 
recognized the need to establish an information sharing infrastructure that would best serve the 
needs of all stakeholders.  Perhaps most salient to improving security, fusion centers serve as the 
formal collaborative mechanism through which private sector organizations – and thus their 
personnel – are woven into the public law enforcement framework.  Asset protection, counterfeit 
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product initiatives, and propriety information security are just a few examples of the unique 
functions private sector personnel offer law enforcement to enhance public safety.  Such 
partnerships have allowed for a more strategic deployment of public safety resources. 
A reliance on private sector collaboration for improved security is also identifiable in the 
contemporary emergence of real-time crime centers (many times operated in tandem with fusion 
centers).  These real-time crime centers rely on vendors such as Microsoft, Motorola, and IBM to 
provide data analysis, real-time video, and communication functions.  These centers have 
recently served critical roles in the carrying out of large-scale events such as the Super Bowl, 
Democratic National Convention, and Republican National Convention.  Information shared and 
analyzed in real-time enabled law enforcement and private security to prevent and mitigate 
threats during these events.   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Results presented here are tempered and should be interpreted conservatively.  A 
pragmatic reality of applied research in the area of law enforcement intelligence is practitioner 
concern over security.  This concern, while justifiable, limited the research design.  Though the 
purposive sampling approach was necessary to access end-users of the fusion center, such a 
method limits generalizability of the findings.  Information presented here is only representative 
of state and local agencies which are on the fusion center listserv, thus they most likely represent 
agencies which are most actively engaged in information sharing.  The findings presented here 
are likely not representative of the average local agency in the state where the study took place as 
most local agencies are not on the fusion center listserv.  However, the intent of this research was 
to specifically focus on end-users of a fusion center intelligence product and not on local agency 
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perceptions of the fusion center.  As noted previously, since access to the listserv was restricted 
and no determinations could be made with regard to the characteristics of responding versus non-
responding agencies, the possibility of non-response bias could not be omitted.  Geographic 
region may also be influential with regard to information sharing.  Since the 9/11 attacks 
occurred in the Northeast region, it is plausible that agencies and fusion centers in this region 
will be more progressive and committed to an information sharing philosophy as compared to 
agencies and fusion centers in regions of the United States that have never experienced a 
terrorism incident.  
Future scientific inquiry into intelligence and fusion centers should consider a number of 
interesting phenomena.  Controlling for geographic differences is an initial step for future 
research to consider.  Scholars interested in further examining end-users of fusion centers should 
attempt to incorporate variation in fusion center models.  Most fusion centers follow an “all 
threat, all crimes, all hazards” concept while a couple are strictly focused on terrorism due to 
their funding mandate (such as the Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center) and some focus 
on “all crimes” to best guide state and local agencies in their combat of street crimes that 
constitute the largest proportion of their time and resources.  One would expect local agencies to 
be more connected to, and reliant on, an “all crimes” center as compared to a terrorism center.  It 
would also be beneficial for future scholars to examine information being pushed (a phrase used 
by Ratcliffe, (2008) in his 3-I model of intelligence-led policing) to fusion centers from outside 
agencies and organizations.  Fusion centers rely on raw information inputs to create analyzed 
intelligence outputs.  In theory, local law enforcement serves as the force-multiplier for fusion 
centers to collect information from the communities.  Very little is known about this aspect of 
information sharing.  Sheptycki (2004) identifies this specific issue with information sharing in 
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that information pushed to centers from local police is typically inhibited by a number of 
organizational differences and incompatibilities across human and technological components.  
Information push is an equally important part of the intelligence-sharing equation and thus 
without examining the degree to which information is being shared with fusion centers, the 
understanding of perceptions of the utility of intelligence products will remain limited.  
In addition, scholars should examine the dynamics between local police satisfaction with 
information disseminated by fusion centers and fusion center satisfaction with information 
provided by the local police.  It is plausible that the quality of intelligence products created by 
fusion centers are a function of the quality of information provided to them from local agencies.  
This is especially important with respect to jurisdiction-specific products that focus on trends, 
new methods of crime, officer safety issues and so on.  Lastly, given the United Kingdom’s 
longer history with intelligence and policing as compared to the United States, an additional 
avenue of future research would be to compile comparative studies on the UK National Crime 
Authority regional information sharing model (based largely on the established National 
Intelligence Model).  This same approach can be employed with the Canadian experience with 
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada Provincial Bureau model.  Both the United Kingdom and 
Canada have best practices for information sharing that could be gleaned and applied to agencies 
in the United States.  
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Tables 
 
Table I. Descriptive statistics for survey respondents (n = 315) 
 Percent (n) 
Type of organization  
Federal 7.9% (25) 
State 25.1% (79) 
Local 61.9% (195) 
Tribal 1%  (3) 
Private 4.1% (13) 
Level within organization  
Upper-level 33.6% (106) 
Mid-level 30.2% (95) 
Frontline 36.2% (114) 
Setting of department  
Urban 67.6% (213) 
Rural 32.4% (102) 
 
 
 
 
Table II. Intelligence Product Dissemination  
 Percent (n) 
How do you receive the intelligence product? (n = 270)  
Personal/work e-mail 84.4% (228) 
From the chief/head of your organization 15.2% (41) 
Look-up manually  .004% (1) 
 
How is intelligence made available to frontline personnel? (n = 268) 
E-mail 63.1% (169) 
Meeting 19.8% (53) 
Posting 4.9% (13) 
Other 4.5% (12) 
Not available 78.4% (21) 
 
To how many people in your organization do you regularly forward the intelligence product e-
mail? (n = 271) 
1-5 people 15.5% (42) 
6-10 people 7.1% (20) 
11-50 people 8.5% (23) 
51or more people 2.6% (7) 
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Table III. Intelligence Product Utilization   
 Percent (n) 
Who in your organization primarily uses intelligence in the intelligence product? 
(n = 258) 
 
Investigative personnel 36.0% (93) 
Everyone 28.7% (74) 
Patrol 24.4% (63) 
Middle management 23.6% (61) 
Senior officials 19.8% (51) 
No one 2.3% (6) 
Other  5.0% (13) 
 
How often do you open the intelligence product attachment to read more about a topic? (n = 272) 
Daily 59.2% (161) 
1-2 times a week 29.4% (80) 
Once a month 2.9% (8) 
Never 2.2% (6) 
Other  6.3% (17) 
 
When was the last time you read the intelligence product attachment closely? (n = 271)  
Within the last day 50.0% (136) 
Within the last 3 days 25.0% (68) 
Within the last week 12.5% (34) 
Within the last month 1.8% (5) 
Cannot remember 10.7% (29) 
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Table IV. Perceptions of Intelligence Product Recipients    
 Percent (n) 
What types of crimes are priorities in your department? (n = 246)  
Property 63.0% (155) 
Violent 57.3% (141) 
Public nuisance 42.3% (104) 
Terrorism 36.2% (89) 
White collar 26.8% (66) 
Other  41.5% (102) 
  
How would you rate the intelligence product on a scale of one to ten?* (n = 260)  
8 to 10 33.8% (88) 
6 to 7 46.2% (120) 
3 to 5 14.2% (37) 
2 and less 5.8% (15) 
  
What frequency of intelligence products would be most useful? (n = 259)  
Daily 38.6% (100) 
Weekly 38.6% (100) 
Bi-weekly 3.5% (9) 
Monthly 2.7% (7) 
Significant event 9.3% (24) 
Other  7.3% (19) 
*1 = Not valuable at all, 10 = Extremely valuable 
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